



This bill, which proposes radical changes in the fundamental
principles of the patent system, which as to basic principles has
been practically unchanged during the history of our government,
has been reported favorably by the patent committee of the House
and now stands upon the House calendar.
Although in purpose and possibly as to one or two of its pro-
visions the bill is not without commendable features, neverthe-
less, as an entirety and as to practically all of its features, it is
highly objectionable.
The objections to this bill may be roughly classed as follows:
First: Because of the manner in which it was prepared and
reported to the House.
Second: Because, if it becomes the law, it will radically change
the entire American patent system.
Third: Because it involves fundamental changes in the law as
to a highly intricate and technical subject in which its framers
have had no training and as to which their knowledge is neces-
sarily very superficial.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the evident fact that Mr. Old-
field and his associates have spent much time and thought on this
bill, it is clear that they have been able to give the matter only a
superficial consideration; that the hearings on the bill have been
wholly inadequate properly to inform them on the subject, and
that they have no clear understanding or appreciation of what
the bill means to one of the most important institutions of our
government, nor as to what its inevitable effects will be.
Fourth: It attempts, in a wholly illegitimate manner, to en-
graft on the patent statutes numerous provisions which, if sound
and proper, should be enacted only as amendments to the Sher-
man Law.
Fifth: It proposes drastic provisions as to sweeping forfeiture
of property rights which are wholly repugnant to the spirit of
American jurisprudence.
Sixth-and this is perhaps the most conclusive reason of all:-
It wholly fails to provide any adequate remedy for the evils at
which it is directed, but, in the endeavor to reach those evils,
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it makes provisions which for the most part can be avoided with-
out much effort by those at whom it is directed, while working
hardship upon innocent owners of patent property.
Considering now the first of these objections:
First: The Oldfield Bill as originally introduced purported to
be a bill for the revision of the patent laws. It never did pro-
vide a revision of the patent laws, and the present substitute bill,
which contains only two sections of the original bill, is in no sense
a general revision of the patent laws but is a hybrid combination
of legitimate amendments of one or two sections of the patent
statutes with the substance of other bills for the amendment of
the Sherman Law, these latter provisions having been changed
so as to make them applicable only to patent property.
Upon the original bill, which was a bill of fifty-one printed
pages, introduced April 26, 1912, there were twenty-seven public
hearings during April and May, relating almost wholly to the dis-
cussion of Sections 17 and 32 of the bill, relating to compulsory
licenses and license restrictions, respectively.
The overwhelming body of the testimony adduced on these
hearings was opposed to these sections, both in form and in sub-
stance.
So far, therefore, the procedure was in accordance with usual
legislative practice, and, as a mere matter of procedure, no ex-
ception could be taken had the members of the committee con-
cluded that upon the hearings as a whole the bill should be ap-
proved.
When, however, it came to the committee consideration of the
bill, the original bill, both in form and substance, was abandoned
as to all provisions except those of Sections 17 and 32. These
sections were rewritten, not only so as to remove objectionable
features which had been discussed at the public hearings, but also
so as to add other features which never had been discussed at any
public hearing, and thereupon so-called "anti-trust" provisions to
the extent of twelve printed pages of the bill were added.
Consequently, the bill in its present form consists of two sec-
tions which, in part only, were considered on the public hearings,
to which is added a large body of "anti-trust" provisions, none of
which were contained in the original bill and none of which were
presented or discussed at the public hearings, and concerning
which no testimony has been taken before the committee.
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Not only is this so, but these twelve pages of "anti-trust" pro-
visions were taken bodily from the LaFollette-Lenroot Bill, as to
which there had been previously full hearings before the House
Judiciary Committee, and which, after these hearings, the Judi-
ciary Committee refused to report favorably.
Nevertheless, as thus illegitimately amended, the Oldfield Bill
was favorably reported to the House by a majority of one in the
committee, many members of the committee not being present,
but accompanied by a report from which it would seem as if
there had been public hearings and testimony as to the entire sub-
stance of the present bill, whereas such is not the case.
Clearly, any bill having this history in committee stands dis-
credited, because it seeks to work radical changes in the law with-
out affording any opportunity for public discussion or public
hearings while in committee.
Second: The results of the American patent system have tes-
tified eloquently to the foresight of the framers of our Constitu-
tion when they provided in that instrument that, for the pro-
motion of progress in science and the useful arts, Congress might
grant to authors and inventors exclusive rights in their pro-
ductions for limited periods.
Our system built upon this constitutional provision has been
highly beneficent and has admirably carried out the expressed
purpose of the constitutional provision by offering the inducement
of exclusive control of new inventions for the period of
the patent grant without terms or conditions of any character as
to working, annuities or otherwise. The poorest man has known
that if he can pay the very moderate cost of obtaining a patent,
he will have exclusive control of the patented invention for a
period of years, thereby leaving him free to profit by it in his own
good time and according to his own unhampered judgment,
coupled with the hope that if he could not immediately promote
his invention either by his own resources or by interesting others,
nevertheless there would be a fixed period of years during which
he would have an opportunity to improve his situation and during
which he had the absolute knowledge that the patent could not
be taken from him for any reason whatever.
Unquestionably, this simple, liberal and beneficent policy has
encouraged hundreds of thousands of men to work constantly
in the development of the useful arts, each hoping that he might
develop an invention which would pay him large returns, many
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of them realizing that hope, and in turn thereby stimulating
others to renewed effort. The aggregate effect of the constant
experimentation and efforts of this vast army of inventors, each
contributing at least his mite to the advance of industrial progress
and many of them bringing out of the unknown and contributing
to the knowledge of mankind inventions which have made mod-
ern civilization possible, has been to give to this country its en-
viable pre-eminence in industrial progress.
We have alike disregarded the patent policies of those coun-
tries in which the patent system is primarily a revenue system,
on the theory that the patentee is paying for a privilege which he
obtains from the government, and of those countries in which it
is in the nature of a protective system offering rewards to those
who actually develop manufacturing industries and bring new
inventions into the realm, regardless of whether or not the pat-
entee was in fact the inventor.
Under our system we have granted nearly eleven hundred
thousand patents for inventions, and today the inventors of this
country are more active than ever before in the history of the
country, the grant of patents having increased almost in geo-
metrical ratio during successive decades.
So true is this that there is hardly an article of modern neces-
sity or luxury which is not due in one way or another to one or
numerous inventions which have been produced by the inventors
of this country. Industries great and small throughout the
country, whether it be the United States Steel Corporation or the
thousands of small manufacturing and selling corporations which
are scattered throughout the country, owe much if indeed not
most of their prosperity and efficiency to the work of the inventor,
especially of the American inventor, who has worked under the
constant stimulus of our liberal and beneficent patent system.
Unquestionably, there have been many industries which would
not have been brought into existence but for our patent system,
because they have necessitated preliminary investigation, experi-
mental work, and the expenditure of vast sums of money which
were provided only because of the prospect of great profits which
would attend success, owing to the monopoly which our patent
system would grant for the inventions.
For the avowed purpose of preventing the concentration of
potentially competitive patents, and for the further purpose. of
preventing the alleged evils growing out of license restrictions
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under patents, the Oldfield Bill proposes to change the finrda-
mental principles of this sy~tem, first by providing for the grant
of compulsory licenses, which in effect is a prgyision for the con-
demnatin of patent rights fpr the benefit of private interests,
and also by depriving the patentee of adequate means for pro-
tecting license limitations, in all cases, and providing penalties
for such license limitations in other cases, To the lyriter, this
seems clearly another instance of proposing to burn the house in
prder to rid it qf vermin.
To ayoid the Fgn~titutional provision that the power qf Con-
gress shall be to grant exclusive rights to irtventor§, the Oldfield
Bill substantially limits the compulsory licensp provisions to
patents under which assignments or licenses have been granted
y the origipal patentee.
Aside from the fact that this is highly q~jectipqable class legis-
laipn, it wholly fails of its object, can have no effect upon
wealthy combinations or wealthy individual inventors and threat-
,ens the possibility of great injury to the inventor of limited
means who can neither develop a patent nor promqte his inven-
tipn without the assistance of others who will f1rni4h the neces:
sary funds only in return for license or assignment rights under
the patent. So, also, it discriminates unfairly against those enter:
prises, whether corporate or individual, which avelop an art
or a busine§ss by employing skilled men to experir tnit and bring
out new machines and inventions.
It is further objectionable in that in this respect the Oldfield
Bill goes farther than the laws of other countries, such as Ger-
many and Gr~pt Britain, in providing as a hard and fast rule that
w llpever it appp as that a certain state of facts exists, a com-P§, y license shal! be granted, leayjng no disretfipin in the
tribipal iyhich passes upon this questip.
In substance, the Oldfield Bill prpvides that whppever the
oxyner of 4 patent fails to compercialy work the patented inypn-
tion, and the pffect of tjis failure is to prevent competition with
some other article made or sold by thp patent owner, then, if it
appears that the application for the patent was file4 at least thre
years prior to the application for a compulsory license there-
under, the Court to which such license application is made shall
decree that a compulsory license be granted on terms, etc.
In Great Britain a compulsory license will be granted only
when in the judgment of the Court it is right and proper, under
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all the circumstances, that such license be granted. The result
has been that the grant of a compulsory license is almost entirely
unknown in Great Britain.
In Germany a compulsory license will be granted only when in
the judgment of the Court the public interest requires it. The
result has been that in Germany also a compulsory license is
rarely asked for and is practically never granted.
The Oldfield Bill assumes that if this compulsory license clause
becomes the law, it will prevent the concentration of patents for
purposes of extinction or suppression, as in the cases of certain
large corporations cited in Mr. Oldfield's report. It is sub-
mitted, however, that those very corporations are the ones best
equipped to evade this provision of the law. They can well
afford to manufacture and catalogue devices under all patents
owned by them, while at the same time commercially controlling
the situation so that because of price, poor design, faulty work-
manship or for any other reason, there will be no commercial
demand or public benefit resulting from thus placing these addi-
tional devices on the market. Indeed, it is pertinent to
inquire wherein the public would benefit by having the owner
of a dozen or a hundred patents manufacture and market
devices under all of his patents instead of under one or two, since
obviously he controls the price of all of them and there will be
no competitive benefit to the pubiic. This is merely an instance
of the ill-considered character of some of the legislative cure-alls
which are proposed.
Another view of the matter is this: The inventor who con-
tributes most to the public good in advancing progress in the
arts is the one who, never content with what he has produced,
constantly advances to a more perfected form, and as he brings
out something better he naturally discontinues the manufacture
and sale of his prior structures. He thus frequently acquires
numerous patents which clearly mark the steps by which he has
advanced and developed the art in which he is working. Is there
any reason of public policy why on the one hand he should be
compelled to lessen the commercial value of what he has pro-
duced by giving competitors who have merely stood by and
watched his efforts the right to use and sell those forms of the
device which he has abandoned because he has produced some-
thing better, or why, on the other hand, he should be discouraged
from producing something better by the knowledge that he must
THE OLDFIELD B1LL
thereafter manufacture and sell all forms of his device or else
take the risk of being compelled to turn over the use of his prior
inventions to intending competitors?
Again, take as an instance Thomas A. Edison, who has taken
-out more patents than any other one man in this country, and
-who has individually sufficient means to develop and promote
-such of his inventions as he may see fit. Under the Oldfield Bill
he, being the original patentee, may suppress any or all of his
potentially competitive inventions. On the other hand, if an
inventor of merit, but without Edison's financial resources, de-
velops numerous inventions, and to enable him to perfect them
-and promote them, is obliged to assign his patents or to grant
licenses under them, the Oldfield Bill provides that compulsory
licenses may be exacted as to any of his patents which are not
,commercially worked.
Or again, it is often the case that it is proposed to develop a
• new art. For example, the automatic manufacture of bottles.
Before success was reached, this enterprise required the expen-
-diture of nearly one-half million dollars. In arrivinig at success
-numerous patents were taken out from time to time and other
-necessary patents were acquired. Having thus staked money in
-such a princely sum upon their confidence in what they could
-ultimately accomplish, must the men who have produced this
-result now commercially work all of the inventions thus produced
-or as an alternative must they grant compulsory licenses, under
the less preferred forms of the invention, to competitors who
have risked nothing or done nothing, but who, in the light of
-what has been accomplished, and with such compulsory licenses
-granted, may very possibly become formidable competitors in the
field?
It is not necessary in this article to generally discuss the sub-
ject of compulsory licenses, but so far as the provisions of the
Oldfield Bill are concerned, the objections may be summarized
-thus:
i. They are ill-considered.
2. In the effort to avoid the constitutional provision as to ex-
clusive rights, they constitute highly objectionable class legisla-
tion.
3. They are futile.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
LICENSES AND LICENSE RESTRICTIONS.
The contention of Mr. Oldfield is that the failure to observe
the restrictions contained in a license is a mere violation of con-
tract for which the remedy lies in a suit in the State Courts.
Nowhere does Mr. Oldfield's utter failure to comprehend the
fundamentals of patent law more clearly appear. A license
under a patent is not a mere contract between the licensor and
the licensee to do or not to do certain things. In the absence
of a license a stranger to the patent has. no lawful right to use the
patented invention either by way of manufacture, use or sale.
If he attempts to practice the invention in any manner he is a,
trespasser who may be enjoined.
In a license agreement, the owner of the patent merely consents,
that the licensee shall have access to the patented invention or
may utilize it to the extent specified in the license and only to.
that extent. In so far as the licensee does anything involving
the utilization of the patented invention, in a manner not author-
ized by the license,.his actions are wholly unauthorized; he is a.
stranger in interest to the patent and is a mere trespasser. Con-
sequently, the practice of a patented invention by a licensee in a.
manner not permitted by the license, leaves the licensee, as to.
such acts, in exactly the same position as if no license had been
granted, and an action for infringement will lie against him, not
because he has violated his license or disregarded his contract, but
because the acts complained of constitute an unauthorized use
of the invention and therefore constitute an infringement of it.
As a rough analogy, a patent may be likened to an apartment
house. A limited license is equivalent to the lease of one apart-
ment. Obviously, if the lessee of one apartment enters into
possession of some other apartment, he cannot justify under his,
lease, and the landlord's right of action is in no sense dependent
upon any covenant or provision of the lease, even though there
be an express covenant that the tenant will not trespass upont
other apartments. Or again, if an apartment be leased for resi-
dence purpose with an express provision that it shall not be used
for other purposes, and the tenant seeks to convert it into a
saloon, the landlord.may enjoin such unauthorized use and the
lease will furnish no justification for the tenant.
From a practical standpoint, this phase of the Oldfield Bill is-
most highly objectionable and destructive of the value of a
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patentee's rights. If he sells exclusive license rights for a.
certain territory, he is enabled to do so by the knowledge of the
licensee for that territory that it may not lawfully be invaded by a
licensee for other territory, because such invasion will be outside-
of the license, and the invading licensee will be subject to action for-
infringement. If the patentee of a machine or process of value-
in the refining of cotton-seed oil finds that his invention is also.
useful in the manufacture of oleomargarine, he can well afford_
to grant a license to a manufacturer to practice the invention
only in the manufacture of oleomargarine, knowing that such
licensee cannot lawfully invade the patentee's own industry of
refining cotton-seed oil without subjecting himself to a suit for
infringement for such unlicensed use.
If a patentee is engaged in manufacturing and selling the-
patented invention, he may well be willing to license another to
also manufacture and sell this device upon the condition that such
use of the invention is only authorized to the extent and so long
as the licensee shall not sell the device lower than the patentee's
established prices; and so, in countless different ways, the money
value- of a patent often depends upon the fact that the patentee-
can sell limited additional and circumscribed licenses and can, by
action for infringement, enjoin any use of the invention outside
of the terms limited and specified in the license. All this the
Oldfield Bill would destroy by absolutely taking away the right of
action for infringement by a patent owner against a licensee for
acts done by the licensee in excess of his license rights.
In his bill Mr. Oldfield seeks to prohibit the practice of selling-
or licensing the use of patented articles upon condition that the-
article shall be used only with unpatented supplies to be furnished
by the vendor or the licensor. This phase of the bill is clearly
inspired by the dissenting opinion of Clhief Justice White in the
mimeograph case (224 U. S., I). He contends that every argu-
ment in support of agreements and licenses of this character as.
to pitented devices is equally applicable to unpatented devices,
seemingly ignoring the fact that as to unpatented articles the
parties to such agreements tie their hands regarding devices
which they would have full and free right to manufacture and'
use in the absence of such agreement; whereas, as to patented;
articles, the restrictions all relate to the use of that which no one
has a right to use without the consent of the patent owner, and,.
in turn, this exclusive right of the patent owner relates solely
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to an invention which was unknown to mankind until produced
by the patentee. Since, therefore, the patent grant takes nothing
from the public domain, it follows that the exclusive control of
that which was previously unknown can work no harm to the
public. Since inevitably the greater includes the less, and the
patent owner has the right to completely suppress the patented
invention for the term of the patent, we fail to see wherein any
hardship is worked to the public if it is permitted to use the
patented invention only upon such terms and conditions as the
.patent owner may dictate.
Mr. Oldfield also seemingly fails to comprehend that the pat-
ented invention and the machine or article which embodies that
invention in useful form are distinctly different subjects of prop-
erty. Although it is true that the sale of a patented article,
without terms or conditions, will carry with it a license to use
and resell, nevertheless this is merely an incident to the fact that
the article is sold by one who has a right under the patent to
grant a license to use and resell. Nevertheless, the two property
rights are absolutely distinct, one being the mere ownership of
the physical structure which embodies the patented invention,
and the other being the ownership of the invention itself. Thus,
the machine may have been manufactured without right by a
stranger to the patent, who could nevertheless convey to the
-purchaser the absolute ownership of the machine as a physical
entity, but could not give him with such sale any right to use the
machine so as to practice the patented invention, or to resell the
machine embodying the patented invention. The purchaser hav-
ing thus acquired physical ownership of the machine might then
separately acquire from the third person who owns the patent
a license right to practice the invention, by using the machine or
by reselling it for such use. Since, therefore, these property
rights are separate and distinct, there is no reason, merely be-
cause he gets his license right as an incident of the transfer to
him by the same person of the physical ownership of the machine,
why the purchaser should not take his license to use and sell
the machine subject to such conditions as the patent owner may
impose.
This being so, there is no hardship for anyone in the right of
the patent owner to demand such consideration as is acceptable
to him in payment for the license rights. He may demand one
dollar or one hundred thousand dollars for the machine and for
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-the unlimited right to use and sell the machine; or he may re-
-quire a per diem or per annum compensation for the use of the
machine; or he may demand a certain percentage of the total
income of the purchaser's business; or he may measure the value
of the patented device to the purchaser by the extent to which the
purchaser uses it, and base his price or royalty either upon the
-output of the machine on the one hand, or by the amount which
-the machine consumes, on the other.
What just or reasonable distinction can be made as to whether
-the vendor of a patented mimeograph shall require the payment
.to him of one dollar per day or of one dollar per copy run off on
the machine, or of one dollar per hundred pounds of ink con-
sumed, or shall less explicitly name his price as the commercial
-profit on the supplies consumed, by specifying that the machine is
licensed to be used only with such supplies as he may furnish?
The market for such supplies, so far as his license limitations
-affect it, exists only as the result of the invention which pro-
-duced the machine which in its operation consumes these supplies.
If our patent system is to continue its beneficent work, it is
imperative that the patent owner shall absolutely control the
terms, price and conditions upon which the patented invention
-may be practiced, and in so doing, since he takes no rights from
the public which it possessed before the patent was granted, and
-obtains no returns from the public except such as directly result
from conditions produced by the development of the patented
invention, it is not seen wherein the public has any right or
interest which requires a curtailment of the patentee's rights, as
they have always heretofore existed.
Clearly, the foregoing is true in any transactions whereby
-prices are fixed or other limitations established as to dealings in-
volving the bona fide use of patented inventions. The only pos-
sible danger to the public lies in using these rights under patents
as a mere cloak or subterfuge for combinations which would
otherwise violate the Sherman Law.
It is, of course, theoretically a dangerous experiment to leave
for judicial determination the question as to whether a contract
involving the use of a patented invention is valid because it is
within the sound business discretion of the licensee as to the
-desirability of using the patented invention upon all or a specified
_part of his output as to which, in consequence, he is bound to
-naintain prices or other specified trade conditions; or whether
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such agreement is a mere subterfuge by which various otherwise
competing merchants agree to use upon their output a patented
feature which is of no real commercial value and which is adopted
merely to clothe an otherwise illegal contract in restraint of trade
in the guise of a legitimate patent license agreement.
In experience, however, the Courts rarely have any trouble in
determining in actual cases from the records, conduct and cor-
respondence of the parties, whether such a transaction is bona fide
or a fraud. If the latter, they have no difficulty in seeing
through the form of the transaction to its substance, and in treat-
ing it accordingly, as clearly appears from the recent decisions
of the Federal Courts in the bathtub case.'
Because of this inherent difficulty in framing a rule or defini-
tion of a course of action which will be legitimate or which in all
cases will be in violation of the law, this phase of the matter
clearly comes within that domain which is best met by statutes in
general terms but of broad scope, such as the Sherman Act, as
applied and interpreted by the Courts, rather than to any specific
statute, such as the Oldfield Bill, which, in a laudable effort to
reach unfair practices, does vastly more damage to legitimate
transactions. The numerous and detailed "anti-trust" features
of the Oldfield Bill are, as previously noted, taken almost bodily
from the LaFollette-Lenroot Bill for the amendment of the
Sherman Law, and if the word "patent" and similar terms were
omitted, they would constitute nothing but a general "anti-trust"
law.
The inherent viciousness of these provisions is that they single
out patent rights and patent property as the especial objects of
"anti-trust" legislation, so that transactions which might be en-
tirely lawful if no patent rights were involved, not only become
unlawful because they relate to this specific form of property,
but also involve confiscation of patents, deprivation of standing
in the Courts and other penalties of a highly drastic nature, as
if the patent system were treated as a menace to the country
instead of one of its most important institutions.
Not only so, but many of the numerous "anti-trust" provisions
are of such a character that it frequently must happen that no
one can know with certainty, until the matter is adjudicated in
a proper proceeding, whether or not a given transaction is or is
' United States v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 191 Fed., 172. Affirmed
Nov. 18, 1912 ( U. S., ).
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not in violation of the law. Yet, notwithstanding this necessarily
indeterminate line between what is lawful and what is unlawftul,
-if it is ultimately determined that a given transaction involving
patent rights is unlawful, the parties to this transaction are sub-
ject to forfeiture not only of the patent rights involved in the
'transaction, but of all other patent rights which they may own
.at the time, and are also subject to outlawry in the Courts so far
.as prosecuting infringers or maintaining any other actions under
'their patents or relating to patent contracts or patent licenses is
.concerned.
This review has necessarily been general in discussing this bill
of sixteen pages and over thirty different substantive provisions.
Various of these provisions have not even been touched upon,
-such, for example, as those in relation to how long a patent shall
-run with reference to the date of the application; a provision
-that an adjudication, in a proceeding by the Government, that
-the Sherman Law has been violated, shall be available in subse-
.quent litigation by parties affected by such unlawful combination
"Without retrying the facts; the provision whereby, in such a pro-
'ceeding by the Government, individuals damaged by the unlawful
-combination may intervene and have their rights adjudicated;
the provision that the Government shall not purchase any pat-
•ented articles during the pendency of any proceeding under the
'Sherman Act alleging violation of said act in the mantifacture or
-sale of said articles, etc., etc. While some of these provisions
;are not without merit, nevertheless, in so far as they are mer-
itorious, they should be embodied in the general law and haye
-no place whatever in patent legislation.
In conhtsion. If it be urged that, notwithstanding the fore-
•going evils exist in our patent system, and that this article merely
criticises the .Oldfield Bill without suggesting anything better,
the reply is that in so far as there are faults in our patent system,
'they relate to matters of procedure rather than to matters of
-substance. The theory and principles of our patent system arp
absolutely sound. The machinery for carrying them opt is n-
'doubtedly faulty, both in the Patent Office and in the Courts, but.
-as to these faults, the Oldfield Bill provides practically nothing
'in the way of a remedy beyond attempting to provide that the
'patentee shall have two years within which to obtain a seventeen-
year patent, and if through his delay he occupies more than two
years in obtaining the patent, then the patent shall expire nine-
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teen years from the date 6f his application. Even the details of
this provision are awkward, and it is believed unworkable,
although perhaps plausible to one who has not an intimate knowl-
edge of the problems involved.
So far as remedial legislation is concerned, the writer would
make the following suggestions. First: In the absence of a better
suggestion, a provision that in the prosecution of patent applica-
tions, the Patent Office be given authority every time it acts upon
an application to fix a definite time in which response must be made.
In practice this plan works out very well in the prosecution of,
applications before the patent offices of the principal foreign
countries.
Second: A revision and simplification of the practice in the
Patent Office whereby one of the three appeals allowed shall be
dispensed with; the interference procedure made more rational
to the end that interferences may be more expeditiously disposed
of; the provision of a new Patent Office with adequate facilities
and an adequate force so that all work can be kept current.
All this is entirely within the province of Congress.
Third: As to procedure in the Courts, it is believed that new
legislation is not necessary. The new equity rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court clearly recognige existing evils and are
planned to simplify and facilitate Court procedure. Whether or
not they will prove adequate is a matter which cannot now be
determined, but it is believed that, except for the provision of
additional judges where needed, the expediting and simplifying
of Court procedure rests in the hands of the Courts themselves,
Fourth: As to the alleged evils of concentrating and sup-
pressing patents to prevent competition, and as to using patent
license conditions as a subterfuge for evading the Sherman Law,
if any legislation at all is necessary it is submitted:
(a) That if the Courts are to be given jurisdiction to decree
the grant of compulsory licenses, they should have such authority
only when a given state of facts is established which may raise
a presumption of illegitimate suppression of competition, b!t
inasmuch as no general rule can be laid down which may safely
be relied on to prove such deliberate restraint or suppression, the
grant of a license should be left to the discretion of the Court if
the Court shall find that, in view of all of the evidence, such a
compulsory license is reasonably necessary in the public interest.
For the public interest is the only possible excuse for any com--
pulsory-license legislation.
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(b) As to illegitimate combinations under the guise of patent
protection, it is believed that the Sherman Law as interpreted by-
the Supreme Court is amply adequate, but if there be any doubt
on this point, then it should be sufficient to add to the Sherman
Law a short section to the effect that no understanding, arrange-
ment or agreement otherwise in -violation of the terms of the-
Sherman Law, but under which the restraint of trade arises as an
incident to the exercise of patent rights, shall be lawful if, in view-
of all the evidence, the Court shall find that the purpose of the-
parties was to use the patent rights as an incident to restraint of-
trade, instead of accepting the restraining features of the license,
as a necessary incident to the acquisition of patent rights desired
and used by the parties bona fide for the purpose of gaining the-
benefits and advantages which would accrue from the license to-
exercise such patent rights.
Whether the writer of this article be right or wrong in his.
views as above expressed, it is perfectly clear that no such
momentous changes in our patent system as those proposed in.
the Oldfield Bill and other bills to follow, as promised in the-
report accompanying the Oldfield Bill, should be made without
first referring the whole subject to a carefully selected commis-
sion including men of wide experience in the practice of the.
patent law, nor until after very full hearings given nation-wide-
publicity as to every feature of any such bill which may be sub-
mitted to Congress for enactment.
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